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ABSTRACT 
?
The paper elaborates influence of the personal values of Europeans on their 
trust in national and EU institutions. We confirmed the hypothesis that personal 
values have no effect on this trust with an exception of citizens’ attitudes 
towards democracy and tolerance. In the countries where democracy is a strong 
personal value citizens also demonstrate high trust in national institutions, on the 
other side in the countries where solidarity is high valued they demonstrate high 
trust in EU institutions. Furthermore, we confirmed that there are statistically 
significant differences in trust in institutions between citizens of the old and the 
new EU27 member states, as well as differences in countries with different types 
of legal systems. In majority of the new EU members citizens have higher trust in 
EU institutions, but lower trust in national institutions than the EU average. On 
the other side, the old EU members demonstrate higher trust in national instituti-
ons and much divided trust in EU institutions. We also indicated that characteris-
tics of the national legal system influence citizens’ trust in national  institutions, 
but they have no influence on trust in EU institutions. Countries with the Scandi-
navian national legal system demonstrate very high trust in national institutions, 
meanwhile trust in national institutions in post-socialistic countries is nearly 
three times lower. 
?
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1.? Introduction 
Many researches reveal significant differences in the Europeans’ percep-
tion of national and EU institutions (Kaase, 1999, McLaren, 2002, Eurobarome-
ter, 2008). The European Commission regularly follows and publishes related 
researches and public opinion polls because they are important indicators of 
cohesiveness and acceptability of the EU among general European public. 
These researches confirm differences between EU regions and countries that 
are relatively stable over time. There are many possible explanations of this 
phenomenon, depending on researchers’ view and selection of observed indi-
cators (Hudson, 2006). The most common justifications are based on historical 
grounds and diverse political and economic development in the particular coun-
try or region. It is a quite convincing explanation in the case of the new EU 
member states, because the majority of studies confirm differences between 
the old and new member states which are reflected in numerous political, 
economic and social indicators (Hofstede, 1998, Halman, 2001, Bavec, 2007). 
Many differences could be attributed to the lower level of economic develop-
ment and also some political circumstances. In many respects, the new EU 
members are still not in the stable state characteristic for the Western democ-
racies. The core of all differences in citizens’ perception lies quite likely in the 
Morgenthau’s conclusion (1995), that the Western societies articulate higher 
level of internal social cohesion than external. Citizens in the old EU members 
predominantly articulate a traditional awareness of national states which is 
reflected in the high national consciousness and emphasis on sovereignty 
which is close to self-sufficiency.  
As the result of political shocks in many new EU member states in the 
20
th
 century, in the citizens’ memory a historical experience with their own 
national states faded out, and some have never had it. We could also presume 
that transition to market economy and to democratic political system left con-
sequences on individual citizens which significantly influence their personal 
values, perception of democracy and legal systems, and consequently their 
trust in national and EU institutions. There are no significant differences among 
Europeans regarding personal values related to inter-personal relations and 
moral principles. Differences are visible mainly in personal values that are in 
some way consequences of previously mentioned historical experiences. For 
example, in our research we identified such differences in citizens’ perception 
of democracy and personal tolerance.  
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We were particularly provoked by statement that is quite often heard par-
ticularly in the political arena that people accept or reject EU on the basis of 
their personal values. There are very few researches that studied an interrela-
tion between personal values and citizens’ awareness of political institutions 
(Hudson, 2006). We could just mention related researches dealing with the 
social capital in Europe which also confirms significant differences between 
regions (van Schaik, 2002, Mihaylova, 2004, van Oorschot et al, 2005). How-
ever, social capital very remotely reflects personal values. We took the oppor-
tunity to use public opinion polls on personal values that was published by the 
European Commission in the Eurobarometers (2008). Our main goal was to 
examine relation between personal values and trust of Europeans in national 
institutions (national legal systems, national governments and national parlia-
ment) and trust in the EU institutions (EU as a political formation, European 
Commission and European Parliament). Furthermore, we were interested if 
this trust is shaped also by general characteristics of the legal environment in 
the particular country. Our assumption was that the legal system reflects his-
torical circumstances under which the particular state was formed and conse-
quently shapes individuals’ awareness of their own country and the EU. There-
fore, we indirectly included into our research the assumption that trust in insti-
tutions depended also on some historical circumstances. 
In the research we did not elaborate economic issues mainly because we 
could not find objective evidence that the level of economic development in-
fluences citizens’ trust in national or EU institutions. However, the current 
economic and consequently social crisis opens many intriguing questions on 
the future trust in national states and particularly in the EU. The recent events 
in Island and Ireland could lead to the conclusion that many things would be 
different after the end of the crisis, including awareness of the EU.  
 
2.? Research goals and methodology 
2.1?Research hypothesis 
In the presented research we used quantitative statistical methods to ana-
lyze differences between personal values and citizens’ trust in national and EU 
political institutions. We also examined impact of different legal systems that 
are characteristical for individual country. Research was based on secondary 
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data from the European Commission’s sources because any primary data col-
lection would exceed the scope of the research group. On the other hand, we 
have at our disposal data at the EU level that have been collected with a com-
mon methodology. All statistical data we have used had been published in the 
Eurobarometer 69.  
The research focused on hypotheses which are based on indices from dif-
ferent researches and some generally accepted assumptions in political and 
professional circles. We concentrated on three hypotheses that could be sta-
tistically accepted or rejected: 
Hypothesis 1: Personal values of Europeans influence their trust in na-
tional and EU institutions. 
Hypothesis 2: There are significant differences between the old and new 
EU member states in their citizens’ trust in national and EU institutions. 
Hypothesis 3: The type of legal system that characterizes particular coun-
try influences citizens’ trust in national and EU institutions. 
 
The first hypothesis reflects the already mentioned assumption that his-
torical circumstances are echoed in the personal values which lead to different 
perception of national and particularly EU institutions. In the hypothesis we did 
not discuss history because we could not objectively define any statistically 
verifiable indicator. We concentrated directly on the personal values. The sec-
ond hypothesis is based on the assumption that there are significant differ-
ences in this regard between the old and the new EU member states. These 
differences are quite often mentioned in political discussions although there 
are very few facts or researches that could confirm them. At least, it is difficult 
to put all new members into one homogenous group. We could argue that 
new member states are composed at least from two different groups that are 
differentiated by majority of social indicators. On one side are Cyprus and 
Malta; on the other are ten post-socialistic countries. The third hypothesis mir-
rors a widely noticed conviction that trust in national and international institu-
tions is also a consequence of different legal systems. For example, we could 
see United Kingdom and its evroscepticism significantly deviating from other 
EU countries, or Scandinavian countries that are notably more benevolent to 
the idea of EU. Particularly this hypothesis grabbed our interest because we 
have not noticed many researches focusing on this issue. 
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2.2? Data used and course of the research 
The personal values are defined with twelve indicators (Table 1). They are 
selected from the regular statistical researches at the EU level (Eurobarometer, 
2008). We opted for these indicators because they were publicly available. 
However, we were fully aware that with such selection we limited the validity 
our research. The personal values for every country are defined in the interval 
from 0 to 1.  
?
Table 1: The personal values of Europeans  
 
No. of  the 
question 
Question ID in the Eurobaro-
meter 
The personal values of Europeans 
1.?  QD2 Peace 
2.?  QD2 Human rights 
3.?  QD2 Respect for human life 
4.?  QD2 Democracy 
5.?  QD2 Individual freedom 
6.?  QD2 The rule of law 
7.?  QD2 Equality 
8.?  QD2 Tolerance 
9.?  QD2 Solidarity 
10.?  QD2 Self-fulfillment 
11.?  QD2 Respect for other cultures 
12.?  QD2 Religion 
Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer 69, 2008 
?
 
Similar explanations are applicable for trust in national and EU institutions 
among Europeans (Table 2). In this case too, the trust is defined in the interval 
from 0 to 1.  
?
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Table 2: Trust of Europeans in different institutions  
?
No. of  the 
question 
Question ID in the Euroba-
rometer 
The personal values of Europeans 
1.?  QA12.5 Trust in national legal system 
2.?  QA12.9 Trust in national government 
3.?  QA12.10 Trust in national Parliament 
4.?  QA12.11 Trust in the European Union 
5.?  QA18.1 Trust in the European Parliament 
6.?  QA18.2 Trust in the European Commission 
Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer 69, 2008 
?
The main objective of the research was the use of statistical methods to 
explore differences in citizens’ trust between the EU countries. We intention-
ally reduced interpretation of results to a minimum to avoid any stereotype 
prejudices and misconclusions. 
 
3.? Presentation of results 
3.1?  Clustering countries with regard to citizens’  
personal values 
The first step in the research was to see if the EU countries form any dis-
tinctive clusters with regard to their citizens’ personal values. The idea behind 
the clustering was to compare the membership of these clusters with another 
set of clusters obtained with regard to citizens’ trust in different political insti-
tution. If the membership of both sets of clusters would be similar or even 
equal than we would conclude that there is interdependence between two 
multi dimensional variables: personal values and trust. As the mathematical 
tool we used hierarchical cluster analysis which allows grouping of variables 
with a larger number of parameters. In our case, there were twelve different 
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personal values for each EU country. The hierarchical cluster analysis also con-
centrates on samples (in our case countries) and not so much on parameters 
(in our case different personal values), as other statistical methods do. It also 
offers a simple and comprehensive visual interpretation of similarities between 
samples (countries), as it can be seen in the Figure 1. 
Analyzing correlations between the individual personal values show that 
they are functionally independent. It proves that they were carefully selected in 
Eurobarometer research. Nevertheless, we can notice some interesting and 
statistically significant correlation that can be relevant for the interpretation of 
results. The correlation between the values “rule of law” and “solidarity” is 
negative (R= -0,673, p <0,01), as well as the correlation between the values 
“religion” and “tolerance” (R= -0,608, p<0,01). Particularly interesting is the 
negative correlation between the values “self-fulfillment” and “human rights” 
(R= -0,523, p<0,01).  
 
Figure 1: Clustering the EU countries with regard to citizens’  
               personal values  
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The figure 1 shows similarities and clustering of the EU countries with re-
gard to their citizens’ personal values. The dendrogram does not indicate any 
ranking and any individual personal value. It just reveals similarities taking into 
account all twelve parameters simultaneously. If we move from the left side of 
the dendrogram to the right we can see which countries are the most similar 
and how they gradually form larger clusters (similar are the countries in the 
same hierarchy). In illustration, let’s take the first four countries in the Cluster 
1. We can easily notice the highest similarity between Belgium and France and 
also between Spain and Portugal. The personal values of the citizens of Bel-
gium and France are very similar, as well as Spain and Portugal. It sounds quite 
reasonably because they are similar also by other criteria, not to mention the 
geographical vicinity. Moving towards the right side of the dendrogram similari-
ties are smaller, but the clusters are larger. At the rescaled distance around 
nine these four countries form a larger cluster showing that they are mutually 
similar but different from members of other clusters. The same logic can be 
applied for all countries in the Figure 1. 
The final clustering of the EU countries was made arbitrary at the rescaled 
distance seventeen. We got seven clusters that separate countries with differ-
ent citizens’ personal values. Clusters reveal that the personal values are not 
equal in all countries and that their distribution is not random over the territory 
of the EU. In the first cluster we can see just the old EU member states (Bel-
gium, France, Spain, Portugal and Netherlands), in the second cluster there are 
three neighboring Central European countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Austria), and in the biggest third cluster there is already a mixture of the old 
and the new member states (Slovenia, Finland, Poland, Estonia, Luxembourg, 
Italia, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania). In the fourth cluster there 
are beside Ireland new EU member states (Ireland, Hungary, Romania, and 
Malta), in the fifth are Greece and Cyprus, in the sixth Germany and Sweden, 
and in the seventh just Denmark, so different in comparison with other coun-
tries that it forms its own cluster.  
Because the third cluster is quite large we can refine our measurement of 
similarities and decide to break it into smaller clusters at the rescaled distance 
ten. In this case we get three sub-clusters. In the first there are Slovenia, 
Finland in Poland, in the second there are Estonia and Luxembourg, in the third 
there are Italy and United Kingdom, and in the fourth Bulgaria, Latvia and 
Lithuania. Obviously, it is up to us to decide how detailed clustering we would 
need for enhanced interpretation of results. 
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3.2?  Clustering countries with regard to citizens’  
trust in institutions 
Based on the same methodology as described in the previous chapter we 
clustered EU countries with regard to citizens’ trust in institutions. We used six 
parameters (Table 2). We can see at a glance that we have got four clusters 
with very different membership as in the case in the Figure 1,  indicating that 
the personal values are not connected to the citizens’ trust in national and EU 
institutions. 
 
Figure 2: Clustering the EU countries with regard to citizens’ trust 
               in national and EU institutions  
 
????? ?
????? ??
??????????? ???
????????? ??
??????? ??
?????? ?
??????? ?
???????? ??
???????? ??
???????? ??
??????? ?
?????? ??
????? ???????? ??
?????? ??
?????? ??
??????? ??
???????? ???
??????? ??
????? ??
????????? ??
??????? ?
??????? ?
?????? ??
??????? ?
?????? ?
??????? ?
?????? ??????? ??
0                 5 10             15 20               25
Cluster A
??????? ?
??????? ?
??????? ?
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
??
At the rescaled distance four we would get seven clusters, as in the case 
of the personal values, however in two clusters there would be just one coun-
try. For that reason we opted for less detailed clustering. At the rescaled dis-
tance seven we get four clusters. The Cluster A links very diverse group of 
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countries (Spain, Malta, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Cyprus). However, more detailed 
insight reveals that Cyprus is relatively unique, and all other are very similar. 
The Cluster B links together the new EU countries (Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia) and Italy. The Cluster C in-
cludes the most economically developed EU member states (Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, Germany, France and Austria) and shows that their citizens 
have very similar trust in national and EU institutions, but quite different from 
other members. As we can see in the Figure 2, United Kingdom forms its own 
cluster that is significantly different from all others, even at the largest rescaled 
distance of twenty-five. 
The membership of the clusters in the Figure 2 are significantly different 
from the membership of clusters in the Figure 1, revealing that the personal 
values have no evident effect on citizens’ trust. For example, Germany, France 
and Austria have very similar attitude towards national and EU institutions (Fig-
ure 2), but very different personal values of their citizens (Figure 1). We con-
firmed the conclusion that the personal values are not related with trust in 
institutions also with bivariant correlations between individual personal values 
and trust in a particular institution. They are nearly all statistically insignificant. 
Nevertheless, we can confirm two related indicators that are interesting to 
notice. The correlation between the values of “democracy” and “trust in na-
tional institutions” is positive and statistically significant (R=0,621, p<0,01), 
which is not the case with “trust in EU institutions”. There is also relatively 
small but positive correlation between the value “solidarity” and “trust in EU 
institutions” (R=0,401, p<0,05), with no significant correlation with “trust in 
national institutions”.  
Factor analysis of parameters defining trust in institutions revealed that 
they are unambiguously divided by two factors: defining trust in national insti-
tutions and trust in EU institutions). Therefore we can introduce two new ag-
gregate variables that can replace all others in our statistical analysis: 
1.? The average (aggregate) trust in national institutions; 
2.? The average (aggregate) trust in EU institutions; 
?
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Table 3: Average trust in institutions by EU countries and types  
              of the legal system 
 
Country 
Average trust in 
national 
institutions 
Average trust in EU
institutions 
Type of the legal system 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Austria 0,54 0,38 German  
Belgium 0,46 0,67 Roman f 
Bulgaria 0,14 0,55 Post-socialist countries (*)  
Cyprus 0,66 0,66 German  
Czech Republic 0,23 0,55 Post-socialist countries (*) 
Denmark 0,71 0,55 Scandinavian  
Estonia 0,50 0,59 Post-socialist countries (*) 
Finland 0,69 0,50 Scandinavian  
France 0,36 0,46 Roman  
Greece 0,44 0,59 German  
Ireland 0,45 0,57 Roman  
Italy 0,21 0,46 Roman  
Latvia 0,19 0,54 Post-socialist countries (*) 
Lithuania 0,18 0,39 Post-socialist countries (*) 
Luxembourg 0,54 0,54 Roman  
Hungary 0,22 0,54 Post-socialist countries (*) 
Malta 0,54 0,60 Roman  
Germany 0,45 0,43 German  
Netherlands 0,57 0,59 Scandinavian  
Poland 0,25 0,54 Post-socialist countries (*) 
Portugal 0,36 0,61 German  
Romania 0,25 0,56 Post-socialist countries (*) 
Slovakia 0,34 0,64 Post-socialist countries (*) 
Slovenia 0,30 0,60 Post-socialist countries (*) 
Spain 0,55 0,61 Roman  
Sweden 0,57 0,47 Scandinavian  
United Kingdom 0,33 0,25 Roman  
Source: Author 
 
Introduction of two new variables (columns 2 and 3 in the Table 3) makes 
much easier interpretations and understanding of results and also easier 
graphical presentation. The Figure 3 shows positions of countries with regard 
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to their average trusts in national and EU institutions. The inner coordinates divid-
ing the graph into four quadrants are aligned by the average trust of citizens of all 
EU member states in national institutions (0,41) and EU institutions (0,53) (Ta-
ble 4). As we see, majority of the new EU members have higher trust in EU 
institutions than the EU average, but lower trust in national institutions than 
the EU average. On the other side, the old EU members demonstrate mostly 
higher trust in national institutions and are much divided in their citizens’ trust 
in EU institutions. United Kingdom is quite unique with very low trust in na-
tional and even lower trust in EU institutions. If we concentrate on the few 
other extremes we can notice very low trust in national institutions in Italy and 
very high trust of citizens of Malta and Cyprus in EU institutions. It is in accor-
dance with our previous conclusion that Malta and Cyprus are new EU mem-
bers, but with significantly different citizens’ values and trust in institutions 
than in other new members from the Central Europe and Baltic.  
?
Figure 3: Distribution of the EU countries with regard to citizens’  
               average trust in national and EU institutions  
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Grouping of new member states indicates certain regularities that are 
consequence of different common experiences. One of them is their recent 
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history and entrance to the EU. Widespread interpretation is that in the phase 
of negotiations and conformation of their legal systems to the EU acquis 
communautaire consequently lead to nearly automatic adoption of EU direc-
tives. In the eyes of citizens it put the national institutions into a second-class 
position in comparison with the EU institutions and it also left an impression 
that EU institutions are generally more democratic and efficient. Another ex-
planation says that there are also historical reasons that shaped citizens’ per-
ception and trust. We have already mentioned Morgenthau’s (1995) view on 
the Western European national states. For that reason we hypothesize that 
basic characteristics of the legal system in particular country or region signifi-
cantly shape citizens’ trust in different political institutions.  
To verify this assumption we grouped EU member states also with regard 
to the type of the legal systems (Table 3) that predominantly reflects their cur-
rent legal regulation (Arminjon, at al, 1952, Zweigert in Kötz, 1998, Grasmann, 
1998): 
1.? Scandinavian  
2.? German  
3.? Anglo-American (Common Law) 
4.? Roman  
5.? Post-socialistic countries. 
?
We have to emphasize that this classification is not black-and-white be-
cause in some cases we have dilemmas how to classify a particular country. 
For that reason we can just talk about prevailing characteristics of the legal 
system in the country. Postsocialist countries are deliberately not classified by 
the type of the legal systems because we presumed that historical reflexes 
had much more significant effect on the citizens’ trust than the current legal 
system in majority of cases still in phase of consolidation. For the purpose of 
our study they are all labeled as post-socialist countries (*).    
Statistically significant differences at p=0,01 between countries with dif-
ferent type of the legal system are present just in the case of trust in national 
institutions. Countries with the Scandinavian type of the legal system have 
very high trust in national institutions (0,64), meanwhile the trust in post-
socialistic countries is nearly three times lower (0,26). 
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Table 4: Average trust in institutions  
 
 
Average trust in national 
institutions 
Average trust in EU  
institutions 
EU average 0,41 0,53 
Average in the old EU members 0,48 0,51 
Average in the new EU members 0,32 0,56 
???Type of the legal system:?   
Scandinavian  0,64 0,53 
German  0,49 0,57 
Anglo-American (Common Law) 0,44 0,47 
Roman  0,42 0,55 
Post-socialistic countries 0,26 0,55 
Source: Author 
?
We cannot notice these differences with regard to the trust in EU institu-
tions that are in the interval from 0,47 to 0,57, and are not statistically signifi-
cant. It is also interesting that statistical One-way ANOVA test confirms that 
the personal values have no relationship with the legal systems, except for the 
value “democracy” which is different in different legal systems (F=5,29, 
p=0,004). Democracy is highest valued in the Anglo-American (0,38) and the 
German legal type (0,31), and far the lowest in post-socialistic countries (0,20). 
3.3? Confirmation of hypothesis 
Comparing the membership of two sets of country clusters with regard to 
their citizens’ personal values (Figure 1) and citizens’ trust in institutions (Fig-
ure 2) we can confirm that these two multidimensional variables are not re-
lated. This conclusion is confirmed also by analyzing bivariate correlations be-
tween individual personal values and average trusts in national and EU institu-
tions which are statistically relevant just for two already mentioned parame-
ters. It means that large majority of personal values do not influence citizens’ 
trust in institution, so we consequently rejected the first hypothesis which 
claims that this influence exists. 
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The average trust in national institutions in the old EU member states is 
0,48 and in the new only 0,32 (Table 4). Differences in trust in EU institutions 
is much lower; 0,51 in the new and 0,56 in the old member states. However, 
the differences in the group of the old members are very dispersed, from eu-
rosceptics like United Kingdom and Austria to noticeably favorable attitudes in 
Belgium, Portugal or Spain. Meanwhile, trust in EU institutions is nearly equal 
in the new member states. All mentioned differences are statistically signifi-
cant at p=0,01, so we can accept the second hypothesis which anticipates that 
there are significant differences between the new and old EU member states 
with regard to citizens’ trust in national and EU institutions.  
The third hypothesis is partially accepted and partially rejected. We ac-
cepted the first part of the hypothesis which claimed that the characteristics of 
the national legal system influence citizens’ trust in national institutions, but 
we rejected the second part which assumed the same for the trust in the EU 
institutions. We have to emphasize that we treated all post-socialist countries 
as one group. If we would classify them with regard to the type of the present 
legal system we would see that majority of them formally belong to the Ger-
man type and two or three to the Scandinavian type. In this case we should 
more carefully interpret results because the German type would be composed 
of two quite different groups of countries with significantly different trust in 
institutions.  
 
4.? Conclusions 
As Morgethau (1995) argued, people comprehend only the ideas that re-
flect circumstances in which they live. This is also true for citizens of the EU 
member states which shape their perception of national states and the EU in 
the framework of their experience from their economic, social and political 
environment. For that reason, understanding their trust in different institutions 
indirectly means understanding their living environment. Our study confirmed 
some known premises, but we also enlightened some less obvious relations. 
As we stressed when we presented the research hypothesis, all the hypothe-
sis look acceptable because they reflect a common perception and even 
stereotypes. Nevertheless, our hypotheses have been just partially confirmed 
because things are not always as they look. The conclusion that personal values 
have no effect on the individuals’ trust in the national state or in the EU is not so 
obvious. Only the values of “democracy” and “solidarity” are connected with 
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trust in institutuons. In the countries where citizens value democracy very high 
they also show very high trust in the national institutions, on the other side in 
countries with high value of solidarity higher trust in the EU institutions pre-
vails. Without detailed elaboration we might conclude that for Europeans the 
EU doesn’t look very democratic, but it definitely means solidarity. 
Because the personal values are not linked to trust in institutions it is ob-
vious that the reasons for differences between countries and regions lies 
somewhere else. Our research suggests that one of the reasons could be their 
history and consequently the type and also stability of the legal system. Trust 
in national institutions is very high in countries with Scandinavian type of legal 
systems, in other countries is average, and it is very low in post-socialistic 
countries. Research also confirmed a widely spread opinion that there are dif-
ferences between old and new EU member states. It is particularly intriguing 
fact that citizens in new member states demonstrate significantly higher trust 
in EU institutions than national. On the other side, it is obviously very hard for 
the citizens of the old EU member states to give up some of their state attrib-
utes on the account of the EU. In our research we did not elaborate the often 
negative attitude of old EU members toward new member states, which is an 
additional burden in their relation to enlarged EU. Researches that were con-
ducted decade ago revealed significantly higher homogeneity and feeling of 
affiliation to the European association of that time.  
However, trust of citizens in the old EU member states is evidently split 
and range from distrust to trust. It is obvious that in these countries there are 
also other reasons that shape perception of political institutions of the EU citi-
zens. Partially, we addressed these issues with differences in their legal sys-
tems. However, it is still an open question and has not been elaborated in our 
research in detail. We did not go into deeper interpretations, leaving them to 
experts from these fields. Our goal was to present data and statistically prov-
able interrelations that could contribute to objective interpretations from different 
points of view.   
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